Similarity and the trustworthiness of distributive judgements

When people must either save a greater number of people from a smaller harm or a smaller number from a greater harm, do their choices reflect a reasonable moral outlook? We pursue this question with the help of an experiment. In our experiment, two-fifths of subjects employ a similarity heuristic. When alternatives appear dissimilar in terms of the number saved but similar in terms of the magnitude of harm prevented, this heuristic mandates saving the greater number. In our experiment, this leads to choices that are inconsistent with all standard theories of justice. We argue that this demonstrates the untrustworthiness of distributive judgments in cases that elicit similarity-based choice

The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experiment

Cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games can usually be sustained only if the game has an infinite horizon. We analyze to what extent the theoretically crucial distinction of finite vs. infinite-horizon games is reflected in the outcomes of a prisoner's dilemma experiment. We compare three different experimental termination rules in four treatments: a known finite end, an unknown end, and two variants with a random termination rule (with a high and with a low continuation probability, where cooperation can occur in a subgame-perfect equilibrium only with the high probability). We find that the termination rules do not significantly affect average cooperation rates. Specifically, employing a random termination rule does not cause significantly more cooperation compared to a known finite horizon, and the continuation probability does not significantly affect average cooperation rates either. However, the termination rules may influence cooperation over time and end-game behavior. Further, the (expected) length of the game significantly increases cooperation rates. The results suggest that subjects may need at least some learning opportunities (like repetitions of the supergame) before significant backward induction arguments in finitely repeated game have force. --Prisoner's dilemma,Repeated games,Infinite-horizon games,Experimental economics

Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma

The imposition of sanctions is one of the most common means of enforcing cooperation in decentralized interactions. Typically, agents are asymmetric in the sense that each has a different sanctioning power. Using a public-good experiment we analyze such a decentralized punishment institution in which agents are asymmetric. The asymmetric punishment institution prevents the decay of cooperation towards the non-cooperative equilibrium level. Strong agents contribute less to the public good, but punish more than weak agents. At the aggregate level, we observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions.asymmetry, decentralized punishment, public good, punishment effectiveness

NCMA GROUNDWATER MODEL USING USGS MODFLOW-2005/PEST

A numerical model for the NCMA aquifer complex is presented. The objective of the study is to develop a numerical groundwater model for the NCMA aquifer system to enhance the understanding of subsurface groundwater flow. Infiltration, streamflow, pumping, and return flows are implemented to characterize the aquifer complex over time. The numerical model is calibrated to municipal and monitoring well data, average monthly water balances, and hydraulic contours. Transient aquifer inflows and outflows are assessed in the results of the study and are compared to balance terms from previous studies. The 2007 Todd Engineers Study subsurface inflows and outflows generate well hydrographs that have greater heads than observed data. Calibration to well hydrographs generated increased subsurface outflow values and decreased subsurface inflow values. It is possible that approximately 250 AFY is leaving aquifer storage

MUSCULAR AND NEURAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO POSTACTIVATION POTENTIATION

Muscle performance is partially a consequence of its recent contractile history. Postactivation potentiation (PAP) can occur after muscle contractions and leads to enhanced neuromuscular performance. The purpose of this dissertation was to explain the relationship between muscle factors (twitch potentiation, TP) and neural factors (reflex potentiation, RP) contributing to overall PAP following a non-fatiguing volitional muscle contraction. The tibial nerves of fifteen resistance trained volunteers (eleven men, four women) were stimulated intermittently at supramaximal (Mmax) and submaximal (Hmax) intensities for 20 minutes on separate days under three conditions: rest (Control); after a after a 10 second maximum voluntary isometric contraction (MVIC) of the plantarflexors; and after a low frequency fatigue protocol prior to the MVIC. Plantarflexion isometric torque and rate of force development (RFD), and soleus and gastrocnemius EMG Hmax/Mmax ratios, were analyzed. Both experimental conditions resulted in TP at 10 seconds post-MVIC compared to the control condition. The two experimental conditions were not different for any measure. Torque and RFD at Hmax (overall PAP) were highest at 3 and 4.5 minutes post MVIC, respectively, but were not significantly different from the control condition. EMG values generally were insignificantly increased in the experimental conditions versus the control condition. Mmax torque and RFD significantly contributed to Hmax torque and RFD at 20 seconds, Hmax peak, and 20 minute post-MVIC time points. The soleus significantly contributed to Hmax torque at 20 seconds and 20 minutes post-MVIC, and Hmax RFD at 20 seconds, 4.5 minutes, and 20 minutes post-MVIC. The results of this study suggest that both muscle and neural factors play a significant role in overall PAP, and that neural factors may play a more meaningful role in RFD potentiation than torque potentiation